- DI & DS
- English Language
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Intelligence & CR
- Alphabet & Number Ranking
- Analytical Reasoning
- Blood Relations Test
- Coding - Decoding
- Comparision of Ranks
- Direction Sense Test
- Mathematical Operation / Number Puzzles
- Series
- Sitting Arrangement
- Statement and Arguement
- Statement and Conclusion
- Statement and Course of Action
- Statement-Assumption
- Syllogism
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Mathematical Skills
- Average
- Calender
- Clocks
- Geometry
- Height and Distance
- Logarithms
- Mensuration
- Mixtures and Alligations
- Number System
- Percentage
- Permutation and Computation
- Probability
- Profit and Loss
- Ratio and Proportion
- Set Theory
- Simple calculations
- Simple Equations
- Simple Interest and Compound Interest
- Time and Work
- Time, Speed and Distance
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7.
Crinoline and croquet are out. As yet, no political activists have thrown themselves in front of the royal horse on Derby Day. Even so, some historians can spot the parallels. It is a time of rapid technological change. It is a period when the dominance of the world's superpower is coming under threat. It is an epoch when prosperity masks underlying economic strain. And, crucially, it is a time when policy-makers are confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.
Welcome to the Edwardian Summer of the second age of globalisation.
Spare a moment to take stock of what's been happening in the past few months. Let's start with the oil price, which has rocketed to more than $65 a barrel, more than double its level 18 months ago. The accepted wisdom is that we shouldn't worry our little heads about that, because the incentives are there for business to build new production and refining capacity, which will effortlessly bring demand and supply back into balance and bring crude prices back to S25 a barrel. As Tommy Cooper used to say, 'just like that'.
Then there is the result of the French referendum on the European Constitution, seen as thick-headed luddites railing vainly against the modern world. What the French needed to realise, the argument went, was that there was no alternative to the reforms that would make the country more flexible, more competitive, more dynamic. Just the sort of reforms that allowed Gate Gourmet to sack hundreds of its staff at Heathrow after the sort of ultimatum that used to be handed out by Victorian mill owners. An alternative way of looking at the French non" is that our neighbours translate "flexibility" as "you're fired".
Finally, take a squint at the United States. Just like Britain a century ago, a period of unquestioned superiority is drawing to a close. China is still a long way from matching America's wealth, but it is growing at a stupendous rate and economic strength brings geopolitical clout. Already, there is evidence of a new scramble for Africa as Washington and Beijing compete for oil stocks. Moreover, beneath the surface of the US economy, all is not well. Growth looks healthy enough, but the competition from China and elsewhere has meant the world's biggest economy now imports far more than it exports. The US is living beyond its means, but in this time of studied complacency a current account deficit worth 6 percent of gross domestic product is seen as a sign of strength, not weakness.
In this new Edwardian summer, comfort is taken from the fact that dearer oil has not had the savage inflationary consequences of 1973-74, when a fourfold increase in the cost of crude brought an abrupt end to a postwar boom that had gone on uninterrupted for a quarter of a century. True, the cost of living has been affected by higher transport costs, but we are talking of inflation at 2.3 per cent and not 27 per cent. Yet the idea that higher oil prices are of little consequence is fanciful. If people are paying more to fill up their cars it leaves them with less to spend on everything else, but there is a reluctance to consume less. In the 1970s unions were strong and able to negotiate large, compensatory pay deals that served to intensify inflationary pressure. In 2005, that avenue is pretty much closed off, but the abolition of all the controls on credit that existed in the 1970s means that households are invited to borrow more rather than consume less. The knock-on effects of higher oil prices are thus felt in different ways - through high levels of indebtedness, in inflated asset prices, and in balance of payments deficits.
There are those who point out, rightly, that modern industrial capitalism has proved mightily resilient these past 250 years, and that a sign of the enduring strength of the system has been the way it apparently shrugged off everything - a stock market crash, 9/11, rising oil prices - that have been thrown at it in the half decade since the millennium. Even so, there are at least three reasons for concern. First, we have been here before. In terms of political economy, the first era of globalisation mirrored our own. There was a belief in unfettered capital flows, in free trade, and in the power of the market. It was a time of massive income inequality and unprecedented migration. Eventually, though, there was a backlash, manifested in a struggle between free traders and protectionists, and in rising labour militancy.
Second, the world is traditionally at its most fragile at times when the global balance of power is in flux. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britain's role as the hegemonic power was being challenged by the rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan while the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were clearly in rapid decline, Looking ahead from 2005, it is clear that over the next two or three decades, both China and India - which together account for half the world's population - will flex their muscles.
Finally, there is the question of what rising oil prices tell us. The emergence of China and India means global demand for crude is likely to remain high at a time when experts say production is about to top out. If supply constraints start to bite, any declines in the price are likely to be short-term cyclical affairs punctuating a long upward trend.[1] By the expression 'Edwardian Summer', the author refers to a period in which there is
(1) unparalleled luxury and opulence.
(2) a sense of complacency among people because of all-round prosperity.
(3) a culmination of all-round economic prosperity.
(4) an imminent danger lurking behind economic prosperity.[2] What, according to the author, has resulted in a widespread belief in the resilience of modern capitalism?
(1) Growth in the economies of Western countries despite shocks in the form of increase in levels of indebtedness and inflated asset prices.
(2) Increase in the prosperity of Western countries and China despite rising oil prices.
(3) Continued growth of Western economies despite a rise in terrorism, an increase in oil prices and other similar shocks.
(4) The success of continued reforms aimed at making Western economies more dynamic, competitive and efficient.[3] Which of the following best represents the key argument made by the author?
(1) The rise in oil prices, the flux in the global balance of power and historical precedents should make us question our belief that the global economic prosperity would continue.
(2) The belief that modern industrial capitalism is highly resilient and capable of overcoming shocks will be belied soon.
(3) Widespread prosperity leads to neglect of early signs of underlying economic weakness, manifested in higher oil prices and a flux in the global balance of power.
(4) A crisis is imminent in the West given the growth of countries like China and India and the increase in oil prices.[4] What can be inferred about the author's view when he states, 'As Tommy Cooper used to say "just like that"'?
(1) Industry has incentive to build new production and refining capacity and therefore oil prices would reduce.
(2) There would be a correction in the price levels of oil once new production capacity is added.
(3) The decline in oil prices is likely to be short-term in nature.
(4) It is not necessary that oil prices would go down to earlier levels.asked in CAT
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8.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more "players" make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the "interests" of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call "interesting" psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel, reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story, on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the "adult" analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detective's path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminal's part or the detective's insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.[1] According to the passage, internal conflicts are psychologically more interesting than external conflicts because
(1) internal conflicts, rather than external conflicts, form an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres.
(2) only juveniles or very few "adults" actually experience external conflict, while internal conflict is more widely prevalent in society.
(3) in situations of internal conflict, individuals experience a dilemma in resolving their own preferences for different outcomes.
(4) there are no threats to the reader (or viewer) in case of external conflicts.[2] Which, according to the author, would qualify as interesting psychology?
(1) A statistician's dilemma over choosing the best method to solve an optimisation problem.
(2) A chess player's predicament over adopting a defensive strategy against an aggressive opponent.
(3) A mountaineer's choice of the best path to Mt. Everest from the base camp.
(4) A finance manager's quandary over the best way of raising money from the market.[3] According to the passage, which of the following options about me application of game theory to a conflict-of-interest situation is true?
(1) Assuming that the rank order of preferences for options is different for different players.
(2) Accepting that the interests of different players are often in conflict.
(3) Not assuming that the interests are in complete disagreement.
(4) All of the above.[4] The problem solving process of a scientist is different from that of a detective because
(1) scientists study intimate objects, while detectives deal with living criminals or law offenders.
(2) scientists study known objects, while detectives have to deal with unknown criminals or law offenders.
(3) Scientists study phenomena that are not actively altered, while detectives deal with phenomena that have been deliberately influenced to mislead.
(4) Scientists study psychologically interesting phenomena, while detectives deal with “adult” analogues of juvenile adventure tales.asked in CAT
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9.
Our propensity to look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the psychological phenomenon of dogmatic thinking or, more generally, dogmatic behaviour: we expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even where there are none; events which do not yield to these attempts we are inclined to treat as a kind of ‘background noise‘; and we stick to our expectations even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept defeat. This dogmatism is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by a situation which can only be dealt with by forcing our conjectures upon the world. Moreover, this dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very nearly right.
It is clear that this dogmatic attitude, which makes us stick to our first impressions, is indicative of a strong belief; while a critical attitude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and demands tests, is indicative of a weaker belief. Now according to Hume‘s theory, and to the popular theory, the strength of a belief should be a product of repetition; thus it should always grow with experience, and always be greater in less primitive persons. But dogmatic thinking, an uncontrolled wish to impose regularities, a manifest pleasure in rites and in repetition as such, is characteristic of primitives and children; and increasing experience and maturity sometimes create an attitude of caution and criticism rather than of dogmatism.
My logical criticism of Hume‘s psychological theory, and the considerations connected with it, may seem a little removed from the field of the philosophy of science. But the distinction between dogmatic and critical thinking, or the dogmatic and the critical attitude, brings us right back to our central problem. For the dogmatic attitude is clearly related to the tendency to verify our laws and schemata by seeking to apply them and to confirm them, even to the point of neglecting refutations, whereas the critical attitude is one of readiness to change them - to test them; to refute them; to falsify them, if possible. This suggests that we may identify the critical attitude with the scientific attitude, and the dogmatic attitude with the one which we have described as pseudo-scientific. It further suggests that genetically speaking the pseudo-scientific attitude is more primitive than, and prior to, the scientific attitude: that it is a pre-scientific attitude. And this primitivity or priority also has its logical aspect. For the critical attitude is not so much opposed to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it: criticism must be directed against existing and influential beliefs in need of critical revision oe in other words, dogmatic beliefs. A critical attitude needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically.
Thus, science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.
The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality. From the point of view here developed, all laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, or conjectural, or hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer. Before a theory has been refuted we can never know in what way it may have to be modified.[1] In the context of science, according to the passage, the interaction of dogmatic beliefs and critical attitude can be best described as:
(1) A duel between two warriors in which one has to die.
(2) The effect of a chisel on a marble stone while making a sculpture.
(3) The feedstock (natural gas) in fertilizer industry being transformed into fertilizers.
(4) A predator killing its prey.
(5) The effect of fertilizers on a sapling.[2] According to the passage, the role of a dogmatic attitude or dogmatic behaviour in he development of science is
(1) critical and important, as, without it, initial hypotheses or conjectures can never be made.
(2) positive, as conjectures arising out of our dogmatic attitude become science.
(3) negative, as it leads to pseudo-science.
(4) neutral, as the development of science is essentially because of our critical attitude.
(5) inferior to critical attitude, as a critical attitude leads to the attitude of reasonableness and rationality.[3] Dogmatic behaviour, in this passage, has been associated with primitives and children. Which of the following best describes the reason why the author compares primitives with children?
(1) Primitives are people who are not educated, and hence can be compared with children, who have not yet been through school.
(2) Primitives are people who, though not modern, are as innocent as children.
(3) Primitives are people without a critical attitude, just as children are.
(4) Primitives are people in the early stages of human evolution; similarly, children are in the early stages of their lives.
(5) Primitives are people who are not civilized enough, just as children are not.[4] Which of the following statements best supports the argument in the passage that a critical attitude leads to a weaker belief than a dogmatic attitude does?
(1) A critical attitude implies endless questioning, and, therefore, it cannot lead to strong beliefs.
(2) A critical attitude, by definition, is centred on an analysis of anomalies and “noise”.
(3) A critical attitude leads to questioning everything, and in the process generates “noise” without any conviction.
(4) A critical attitude is antithetical to conviction, which is required for strong beliefs.
(5) A critical attitude leads to questioning and to tentative hypotheses.[5] According to the passage, which of the following statements best describes the difference between science and pseudo-science?
(1) Scientific theories or hypothesis are tentatively true whereas pseudo-sciences are always true.
(2) Scientific laws and theories are permanent and immutable whereas pseudo-sciences are contingent on the prevalent mode of thinking in a society.
(3) Science always allows the possibility of rejecting a theory or hypothesis, whereas pseudo-sciences seek to validate their ideas or theories.
(4) Science focuses on anomalies and exceptions so that fundamental truths can be uncovered, whereas pseudo-sciences focus mainly on general truths.
(5) Science progresses by collection of observations or by experimentation, whereas pseudo-sciences do not worry about observations and experiments.asked in CAT
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10.
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract. In order to do this we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established. This way of regarding the principles of justice, I shall call justice as fairness. Thus, we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what constitute his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty determines the principles of justice.
In ‘justice as fairness’, the original position is not an actual historical state of affairs. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.
Justice as fairness begins with one of the most general of all choices which persons might make together, namely, with the choice of the first principles of a conception of justice which is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions. Then, having chosen a conception of justice, we can suppose that they are to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in accordance with the principles of justice initially agreed upon. Our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it. Moreover, assuming that the original position does determine a set of principles, it will then be true that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles, those engaged in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to which they would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relation with respect to one another were fair. They could all view their arrangements as meeting the stipulations which they would acknowledge in an initial situation that embodies widely accepted and reasonable constraints on the choice of principles. The general recognition of this fact would provide the basis for a public acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice. No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.[1] A just society, as conceptualized in the passage, can be best described as:
(1) A Utopia in which everyone is equal and no one enjoys any privilege based on their existing positions and powers.
(2) A hypothetical society in which people agree upon principles of justice which are fair.
(3) A society in which principles of justice are not based on the existing positions and powers of the individuals.
(4) A society in which principles of justice are fair to all.
(5) A hypothetical society in which principles of justice are not based on the existing positions and powers of the individuals.[2] The original agreement or original position in the passage has been used by the author as:
(1) A hypothetical situation conceived to derive principles of justice which are not influenced by position, status and condition of individuals in the society.
(2) A hypothetical situation in which every individual is equal and no individual enjoys any privilege based on the existing positions and powers.
(3) A hypothetical situation to ensure fairness of agreements among individuals in society.
(4) An imagined situation in which principles of justice would have to be fair.
(5) An imagined situation in which fairness is the objective of the principles of justice to ensure that no individual enjoys any privilege based on the existing positions and powers.[3] Which of the following best illustrates the situation that is equivalent to choosing "the principles of justice" behind a "veil of ignorance"?
(1) The principles of justice are chosen by businessmen, who are marooned on an uninhabited island after a shipwreck, but have some possibility of returning.
(2) The principles of justice are chosen by a group of school children whose capabilities are yet to develop.
(3) The principles of justice are chosen by businessmen, who are marooned on an uninhabited island after a shipwreck and have no possibility of returning.
(4) The principles of justice are chosen assuming that such principles will govern the lives of the rule makers only in their next birth if the rule makers agree that they will be born again.
(5) The principles of justice are chosen by potential immigrants who are unaware of the resources necessary to succeed in a foreign country.[4] Why, according to the passage, do principles of justice need to be based on an original agreement?
(1) Social institutions and laws can be considered fair only if they conform to principles of justice.
(2) Social institutions and laws can be fair only if they are consistent with the principles of justice as initially agreed upon.
(3) Social institutions and laws need to be fair in order to be just.
(4) Social institutions and laws evolve fairly only if they are consistent with the principles of justice as initially agreed upon.
(5) Social institutions and laws conform to the principles of justice as initially agreed upon.[5] Which of the following situations best represents the idea of justice as fairness, as argued in the passage?
(1) All individuals are paid equally for the work they do.
(2) Everyone is assigned some work for his or her livelihood.
(3) All acts of theft are penalized equally.
(4) All children are provided free education in similar schools.
(5) All individuals are provided a fixed sum of money to take care of their health.asked in CAT
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11.
Fifteen years after communism was officially pronounced dead, its spectre seems once again to be haunting Europe. Last month, the Council of Europe‘s parliamentary assembly voted to condemn the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes,“ linking them with Nazism and complaining that communist parties are still legal and active in some countries.“Now Goran Lindblad, the conservative Swedish MP behind the resolution, wants to go further. Demands that European Ministers launch a continent-wide anti-communist campaign - including school textbook revisions, official memorial days, and museums - only narrowly missed the necessary two-thirds majority. Mr. Lindblad pledged to bring the wider plans back to the Council of Europe in the coming months.
He has chosen a good year for his ideological offensive: this is the 50th anniversary of Nikita Khrushchev‘s denunciation of Josef Stalin and the subsequent Hungarian uprising, which will doubtless be the cue for further excoriation of the communist record. Paradoxically, given that there is no communist government left in Europe outside Moldova, the attacks have if anything, become more extreme as time has gone on. A clue as to why that might be can be found in the rambling report by Mr. Lindblad that led to the Council of Europe declaration. Blaming class struggle and public ownership, he explained different elements of communist ideology such as equality or social justice still seduce many “and a sort of nostalgia for communism is still alive.“ Perhaps the real problem for Mr. Lindblad and his right-wing allies in Eastern Europe is that communism is not dead enough - and they will only be content when they have driven a stake through its heart.
The fashionable attempt to equate communism and Nazism is in reality a moral and historical nonsense. Despite the cruelties of the Stalin terror, there was no Soviet Treblinka or Sorbibor, no extermination camps built to murder millions. Nor did the Soviet Union launch the most devastating war in history at a cost of more than 50 million lives oe in fact it played the decisive role in the defeat of the German war machine. Mr. Lindblad and the Council of Europe adopt as fact the wildest estimates of those killed by communist regimes (mostly in famines) from the fiercely contested Black Book of Communism, which also underplays the number of deaths attributable to Hitler. But, in any case, none of this explains why anyone might be nostalgic in former communist states, now enjoying the delights of capitalist restoration. The dominant account gives no sense of how communist regimes renewed themselves after 1956 or why Western leaders feared they might overtake the capitalist world well into the 1960s. For all its brutalities and failures, communism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere delivered rapid industrialization, mass education, job security, and huge advances in social and gender equality. Its existence helped to drive up welfare standards in the West, and provided a powerful counterweight to Western global domination.
It would be easier to take the Council of Europe‘s condemnation of communist state crimes seriously if it had also seen fit to denounce the far bloodier record of European colonialism oe which only finally came to an end in the 1970s. This was a system of racist despotism, which dominated the globe in Stalin‘s time. And while there is precious little connection between the ideas of fascism and communism, there is an intimate link between colonialism and Nazism. The terms lebensraum and konzentrationslager were both first used by the German colonial regime in south-west Africa (now Namibia), which committed genocide against the Herero and Nama peoples and bequeathed its ideas and personnel directly to the Nazi party.
Around 10 million Congolesedied as a result of Belgian forced labour and mass murder in the early twentieth century; tens of millions perished in avoidable or enforced famines in British-ruled India; up to a million Algerians died in their war for independence, while controversy now rages in France about a new law requiring teacher to put a positive spin on colonial history. Comparable atrocities were carried out by all European colonialists, but not a word of condemnation from the Council of Europe. Presumably, European lives count for more.
No major twentieth century political tradition is without blood on its hands, but battles over history are more about the future than the past. Part of the current enthusiasm in official Western circles for dancing on the grave of communism is no doubt about relations with today‘s Russia and China. But it also reflects a determination to prove there is no alternative to the new global capitalist order - and that any attempt to find one is bound to lead to suffering. With the new imperialism now being resisted in the Muslim world and Latin America, growing international demands for social justice and ever greater doubts about whether the environmental crisis can be solved within the existing economic system, the pressure for alternatives will increase.[1] Among all the apprehensions that Mr. Goran Lindblad expresses against communism, which one gets admitted, although indirectly, by the author?
(1) There is nostalgia for communist ideology even if communism has been abandoned by most European nations.
(2) Notions of social justice inherent in communist ideology appeal to critics of existing systems.
(3) Communist regimes were totalitarian and marked by brutalities and large scale violence.
(4) The existing economic order is wrongly viewed as imperialistic by proponents of communism.
(5) Communist ideology is faulted because communist regimes resulted in economic failures.[2] What, according to the author, is the real reason for a renewed attack against communism?
(1) Disguising the unintended consequences of the current economic order such as social injustice and environmental crisis.
(2) Idealising the existing ideology of global capitalism.
(3) Making communism a generic representative of all historical atrocities, especially those perpetrated by the European imperialists.
(4) Communism still survives, in bits and pieces, in the minds and hearts of people.
(5) Renewal of some communist regimes has led to the apprehension that communist nations might overtake the capitalists.[3] The author cites examples of atrocities perpetrated by European colonial regimes in order to
(1) compare the atrocities committed by colonial regimes with those of communist regimes.
(2) prove that the atrocities committed by colonial regimes were more than those of communist regimes.
(3) prove that, ideologically, communism was much better than colonialism and Nazism.
(4) neutralise the arguments of Mr.Lindblad and to point out that the atrocities committed by colonial regimes were more than those of communist regimes.
(5) neutralise the arguments of Mr. Lindblad and to argue that one needs to go beyond and look at the motives of these regimes.[4] Why, according to the author, is Nazism closer to colonialism than it is to communism?
(1) Both colonialism and Nazism were examples of tyranny of one race over another.
(2) The genocides committed by the colonial and the Nazi regimes were of similar magnitude.
(3) Several ideas of the Nazi regime were directly imported from colonial regimes.
(4) Both colonialism and Nazism are based on the principles of imperialism.
(5) While communism was never limited to Europe, both the Nazis and the colonialists originated in Europe.[5] Which of the following cannot be inferred as a compelling reason for the silence of the Council of Europe on colonial atrocities?
(1) The Council of Europe being dominated by erstwhile colonialists.
(2) Generating support for condemning communist ideology.
(3) Unwillingness to antagonize allies by raking up an embarrassing past.
(4) Greater value seemingly placed on European lives.
(5) Portraying both communism and Nazism as ideologies to be condemned.asked in CAT
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12.
Every civilized society lives and thrives on a silent but profound agreement as to what is to be accepted as the valid mould of experience. Civilization is a complex system of dams, dykes, and canals warding off, directing, and articulating the influx of the surrounding fluid element; a fertile fenland, elaborately drained and protected from the high tides of chaotic, unexercised, and inarticulate experience. In such a culture, stable and sure of itself within the frontiers of 'naturalized' experience, the arts wield their creative power not so much in width as in depth. They do not create new experience, but deepen and purify the old. Their works do not differ from one another like a new horizon from a new horizon, but like a madonna from a madonna.
The periods of art which are most vigorous in creative passion seem to occur when the established pattern of experience loosens its rigidity without as yet losing its force. Such a period was the Renaissance, and Shakespeare its poetic consummation. Then it was as though the discipline of the old order gave depth to the excitement of the breaking away, the depth of job and tragedy, of incomparable conquests and irredeemable losses. Adventurers of experience set out as though in lifeboats to rescue and bring back to the shore treasures of knowing and feeling which the old order had left floating on the high seas. The works of the early Renaissance and the poetry of Shakespeare vibrate with the compassion for live experience in danger of dying from exposure and neglect. In this compassion was the creative genius of the age. Yet, it was a genius of courage, not of desperate audacity. For, however elusively, it still knew of harbours and anchors, of homes to which to return, and of barns in which to store the harvest. The exploring spirit of art was in the depths of its consciousness still aware of a scheme of things into which to fit its exploits and creations.
But the more this scheme of things loses its stability, the more boundless and uncharted appears the ocean of potential exploration. In the blank confusion of infinite potentialities flotsam of significance gets attached to jetsam of experience; for everything is sea, everything is at sea -
.... The sea is all about us;
The sea is the land's edge also, the granite
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses
Its hints of earlier and other creation ...
- and Rilke tells a story in which, as in T.S. Eliot's poem, it is again the sea and the distance of 'other creation' that becomes the image of the poet's reality. A rowing boat sets out on a difficult passage. The oarsmen labour in exact rhythm. There is no sign yet of the destination. Suddenly a man, seemingly idle, breaks out into song. And if the labour of the oarsmen meaninglessly defeats the real resistance of the real waves, it is the idle single who magically conquers the despair of apparent aimlessness. While the people next to him try to come to grips with the element that is next to them, his voice seems to bind the boat to the farthest distance so that the farthest distance draws it towards itself. 'I don't know why and how,' is Rilke's conclusion, 'but suddenly I understood the situation of the poet, his place and function in this age. It does not matter if one denies him every place - except this one. There one must tolerate him.'[1] In the passage, the expression “like a madonna from a madonna” alludes to
(1) The difference arising as a consequence of artistic license.
(2) The difference between two artistic interpretations.
(3) The difference between ‘life’ and ‘interpretation of life’.
(4) The difference between ‘width’ and ‘depth’ of creative power.
(5) The difference between the legendary character and the modern day singer.[2] The sea and ‘other creation’ leads Rilke to
(1) Define the place of the poet in his culture.
(2) Reflect on the role of the oarsman and the singer.
(3) Muse on artistic labour and its aim lessens.
(4) Understand the elements that one has to deal with.
(5) Delve into natural experience and real waves.[3] According to the passage, the term “adventurers of experience” refers to
(1) Poets and artists who are driven by courage.
(2) Poets and artists who create their own genre.
(3) Poets and artists of the Renaissance.
(4) Poets and artists who revitalize and enrich the past for us.
(5) Poets and artists who delve in flotsam and jetsam in sea.asked in CAT
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